



Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The role of the United States and South Korea

Senior Scholars
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North Korea missile launch



Source: www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56533260



Questions

- What is its implication on the peace and security in the East Asian region and the United States?
- What are the United States' (and South Korea's) policy toward North Korea for the peace and security in the Asia Pacific region?

Outline

- Part I. Implication of the recent missile launch
 - Military capacity and nuclear weapons program
 - Goals and intention
- Part II. US and South Korea's policy toward North Korea
 - U.S. policy toward North Korea
 - ROK policy toward North Korea



Part I. Implication

Implication 1: Improved Technology



Vipin Narang @NarangVipin · Mar 25

I think the story with this KN23 variant is this massive payload upgrade. This gives North Korea the flexibility to use a not-so-compact nuclear warhead on this missile. On [@ArmsControlWonk](#) 0 (fart) to 10 (ICBM) scale, I put this test at a solid (fuel) 6. Others may disagree.



Martyn Williams ✓ @martyn_williams · Mar 25

Just In: North Korea says Thursday's test was successful and of "newly-developed new-type tactical guided missiles." The new missiles "improved the weight of its warhead to 2.5 tons while using the core technology." Overseen by Ri Pyong Chol. No mention of Kim Jong Un present.



5



16



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
Assoc Prof [@MIT](#), Nonres Scholar [@CarnegieEndow](#) Nuclear Policy, chemical engineer long ago, studies all things nuclear prolif and strategy,



Source:


<https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/>

Test Results




What missiles does North Korea have?

Estimated ranges in km



Why height matters

Missiles launched to high altitude could travel further on a lower trajectory



- ① 28 Jul: **Hwasong-14**
3,000km alt, 900km distance travelled. Potential range: 10,000 km
- ② 29 Aug - **Hwasong 12**
550km alt, 2,700km distance travelled.
- ③ 15 Sep - **Hwasong 12:**
770km alt, 3,700 distance travelled.
- ④ 28 Nov - **Hwasong 15:**
4,500km alt, 1,000km distance. Potential range: 13,000km.



Nuclear Tests

- 2006 (1st Nuclear Test): < 1 kiloton
- 2009 (2nd Nuclear Test): 4 kilotons
- 2017 (6th Nuclear Test): 140-250 kilotons

Note. Hiroshima's atomic bomb: 15 kilotons



U.S. Diplomacy towards North Korea

- Axis of Evil
- Strategic Patience
- Six Party Talk
- Maximum Pressure
 - The 'Fire and Fury' Era
 - The Singapore Summit



Implication 2: Increased Price

Kim Jong Un demanded partial sanctions relief in exchange for limited nuclear dismantlement (Hanoi, 2019)

“It will only be a waste of time to sit with the U.S. as it is not ready to feel and accept new change and new times,”...

“We make it clear that we won’t give such opportunities as in Singapore and Hanoi again.”

- Choi Son-Hui

Source: Wall Street Journal

Kim Jong-Un's Nuclear Ambitions

- longer-range missiles
- better missiles
- hypersonic missile
- military reconnaissance satellites
- solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles
- new unmanned aerial vehicle
- new nuclear warheads
- tactical nuclear weapons



True Objectives of Nuclear Program?

1. a bargaining chip for economic gain, or
2. a truly credible deterrent of war for regime survival



Implication 3: Now a truly credible threat

North Korea's nuclear forces now

- can present a credible threat to the existence of the United States' allies such as South Korea
- can reach the United States
- driving a wedge between the United States and South Korea or “de-coupling” can further deteriorate security on the Korean Peninsula




Part II-I. U.S. North Korea Policy



Virtual Meeting

The Future of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea

Tuesday, September 22, 2020





DPRK's TTRT (Test-Talk&Wait-Retract-Test) Pattern

- *“North Korea comes to dialogue, then retracts, using the U.S.’s ‘hostile policy’ as an excuse to conduct missile or nuclear tests, then re-enters dialogue to dampen sanctions implementation or reduce tension.”*
 - Jung H. Pak, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies



Maximum Pressure from Sanctions

1. Has continued to bring North Korea back to the negotiation table
2. Has not been effective in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula



Common recommendations

1. New administration's immediate efforts to resume negotiations with North Korea
2. Focusing on the immediate security gains for an interim step – “sequential small deal” rather than demanding a “one-shot deal.”



Should the United States' Goal be Revisited?

- Perspective that “North Korea is never going to give up on developing their nuclear weapons program”
- US wants a “complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula”

No Libya Model

ASIA PACIFIC | How the 'Libya Model' Became a Sticking Point in North Korea Nuclear Talks

intelligence agencies believe it has [20 to 60 more](#), as well as intercontinental ballistic [missiles capable of striking the United States](#).



John R. Bolton in 2004. "We have very much in mind the Libya model from 2003, 2004," he said last weekend. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images



Vice President Mike Pence Archived 

@VP45



As @POTUS Trump made clear, this will only end like the Libya model ended if Kim Jong-un doesn't make a deal.



8:09 PM · May 21, 2018



4.4K



586



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Other recommendations

- 3. Do not provoke North Korea by attempting regime change in North Korea
 - If “*security dilemma*” is North Korea’s true motivation for wanting self-deterrence through expanding nuclear capacity, signaling preference toward the “Libya model” is dangerous
- 4. Confidence-building measures and arms control (in the case of crisis escalation)
- 5. US-ROK joint threat reduction strategy (in the status quo scenario)



Part II-II. South Korea's North Korea Policy



South Korea's North Korea Diplomacy Timeline

- **The Sunshine Policy:** Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003)
- **The “Policy for Peace and Prosperity”** - reconciliation efforts with North Korea: Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008)
- **"Initiative for Denuclearization and Opening up North Korea“:** Lee Myung Bak (2008-2012)
- **Trustpolitik:** Park Geun Hye (2013-2017)



Four Strategies

Moon Jae-in's Policy on the Korean Peninsula

Is a long-term and comprehensive policy led by Korea to realize 'peace' and 'prosperity' on the Korean Peninsula as well as Northeast Asia together with North Korea, regional neighbors, and the international society.



■ 'Peace' First

Peace is the value that we should uphold with the highest priority, as well as the foundation for prosperity.

■ Spirit of 'Mutual Respect'

We pursue a "Korean Peninsula of co-prosperity", where South and North respect and cooperate with each other, by defining our stance as the "3-Nos" - no desire for the North's collapse, no pursuit of unification by absorption, and no pursuit of unification through artificial means.

■ 'Open' Policy

The policy will be completed through public participation and interaction to ensure that the policy can be fully understood by – and made by – the people.

Three Goals

Four Strategies

Five Principles



01. Taking a Step-by-Step and Comprehensive Approach

- We will peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, using a step-by-step, two-track approach of sanctions / pressure and dialogue. (nuclear freeze → complete denuclearization)
- While solving the nuclear issue, we will seek to fundamentally eliminate security threats by establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and facilitating improvement in relations between North Korea and the international community.

02. Tackling the Issues of Inter-Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Threat Simultaneously

- Resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and improvement of inter-Korean relations are not two separate matters that require a choice or prioritization. Both can see progress simultaneously by complementing each other in a virtuous circle.
- If we reestablish channels for inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, we will be able to facilitate multilateral talks for the resolution of the nuclear issue.



03. Ensuring Sustainability through Institutionalization

- We will push ahead with a 'National Unification Contract' based on a national consensus to ensure consistency in our North Korea policy
- We will enact inter-Korean agreements into law and conclude a 'New Inter-Korean Basic Agreement' to establish sustainable inter-Korean relations.

04. Laying the Foundation for Peaceful Unification through Mutually Beneficial Cooperation

- We will restore national homogeneity and build an inter-Korean community by expanding various inter-Korean exchanges.
- We aim for unification that naturally occurs as part of the process of promoting the coexistence and co-prosperity of the two Koreas and recovering the Korean national community.

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